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Abstract. We evaluate the power of simple networks side-channels to
violate user privacy on Android devices. Specifically, we show that, using
blackbox network metadata alone (i.e., traffic statistics such as transmis-
sion time and size of packets) it is possible to infer several elements of
a user’s location and also identify their web browsing history (i.e, which
sites they visited). We do this with relatively simple learning and classi-
fication methods and basic network statistics. For most Android phones
currently on the market, such process-level traffic statistics are available
for any running process, without any permissions control and at fine-
grained details, although, as we demonstrate, even device-level statistics
are sufficient for some of our attacks. In effect, it may be possible for
any application running on these phones to identify privacy-revealing el-
ements of a user’s location, for example, correlating travel with places of
worship, point-of-care medical establishments, or political activity.
Keywords: Android Security · Network Side Channel · Location Privacy ·Web
Browser Privacy.
1 Introduction
Increasingly, people are using smartphones for essential tasks in their everyday
lives such as navigation, communication, scheduling, banking, dating, and the
like. To facilitate this transformation, users gladly install applications (apps)
and carry them around, well within their personal space and everywhere they
go. Simultaneous with this increased utility is an invariable loss of privacy.
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release: distribution unlim-
ited. Arkady Yerukhimovich’s work supported by the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency under Air Force Contract No. FA8702-15-D-0001. Any opinions,
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2 M. Andreev et al.
More precisely, modern smartphones are equipped with a wide variety of sen-
sors, ranging from GPS, triaxial accelerometers, gyroscopes, and magnetometers
to stereo-microphones and cameras; smartphones are also equipped with soft-
ware “sensors” monitoring data usage, orientation and the like. In all, these
phones collect vast amounts of private information about their users. Indeed,
many app developers use such private data collection as their primary revenue
stream, “freely” offering the apps in a Faustian exchange for sensor data, which
may be used or resold to advertisers [4, 20, 29]. More general privacy concerns
for smartphones abound in the literature [7, 14, 31].
In an attempt to alleviate these privacy concerns, the makers of smartphones
have provided mechanisms for users to control what sensors and personal data an
application may access. For example, Google’s Android requires that applications
request permissions to access sensitive data or sensors, either at install time
(“Normal” permissions) or at run time (“Dangerous” permissions). In principle,
this allows a user to see what information an application wishes to use, and to
deny access if the user feels that such access is not warranted.
The reality, however, is that not all sensors and data types require permis-
sions, meaning that some information not deemed sensitive by Google can be
accessed by any application. Furthermore, this allowed information can introduce
side-channels that, when combined with other seemingly non-sensitive informa-
tion, can be used to deduce private details. For example, Narain et al. [26] show
that using gyroscope, accelerometer, and magnetometer information, all accessi-
ble with no permissions on later-model phones, an app can deduce a user’s loca-
tion with fine accuracy (which is otherwise considered sensitive and permissions-
protected). This highlights a major shortcoming of the permissions model: users
(and developers) are unlikely to fully comprehend the implications of such side
channels, and thus will not know how they are compromising their own privacy
by approving permissions requests.
In this paper we investigate how one such side channel can be used to com-
promise aspects of user privacy on Android devices. Specifically, we consider the
network side-channel, which consists of information such as the sizes and timings
of packets sent over the network by the Android device. We note that this data
is accessible to any application running on most Android devices thus giving
any adversarial app access to this information. We show that this side-channel is
quite powerful in revealing different types of private information about the user
through the use of an experimental attack that relies exclusively on network side
channel data that is collected, without access to any physical sensors or oper-
ating system permissions. Our first attack learns features of a user’s physical
location using simple statistical analysis, and our second attack learns a user’s
web browsing habits using simple machine learning. Lastly, we would like to
stress that this paper is not about improving the state-of-the-art performance
of the specific side-channel attacks; with some solid engineering polish and more
sophisticated tools, we are confident that the results can be sharpened, and pos-
sibly even significantly so. The aim of the work is to highlight the ease with
which some private information is accessible through the network side-channel,
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despite the current mitigations. Our point is that just about any app developer,
with only the most basic machine learning skills, can, today, mine the private
information of the app’s user base.
1.1 Results
Our main results are as follows.
For the case of location privacy, we show that significant elements of a user’s lo-
cation and movement may be inferred from the network side-channel (without re-
quiring any permissions) while another location-privileged app is running. Specif-
ically, with access to only the timing and size of packets transmitted through
Google Maps, we can learn:
– whether or not the user is moving,
– the user’s approximate rate of motion,
– some elements of a user’s surroundings (e.g. in a city, in a remote location,
...) and,
– whether the user traversed certain specific paths.
For the case of web browsing, we show that we can differentiate between many
of the websites visited by the user, by observing only device level network usage
data (i.e., across all applications on the phone). Specifically, with access to only
the aggregate timing and size of packets transmitted by the applications on the
device, we can learn:
– which of two websites a user visits with greater than 90% certainty,
– whether a user visits one of 35 common, “distinctive”, websites with 75%
certainty, and
– which of 128 popular websites a user visits with certainty greater than 16%.
These latter results are robust to some standard network traffic analysis coun-
termeasures, such as random session and packet padding.
We note that the location results are valid for most Android phones on the
market today, whereas the web browsing results are valid on all Android phones.
In both cases, our results rely on well-used machine learning techniques, and
their simplicity and robustness are thus surprising.
1.2 Paper Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the network side-channel and what types of applications may be vulnerable to
its use, followed, in Section 3, with a review of some related work. Then, in
Sections 4 and 5, we describe the experimental methodology and results for the
attacks against location and browsing privacy. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
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2 The Network Side-Channel
The network side-channel is a source of metadata about packets that are trans-
mitted by another process. Such metadata typically include precise times when
a process transmits and receives packets, and the sizes of these packets. We as-
sume that the packets themselves are encrypted and, though the target address
of the packets may be generally accessible in plaintext (e.g., for routing), it is
not specifically accessible for our purposes.
In general, despite the inaccessible contents of transmitted packets, the net-
work side-channel is an excellent source of information for applications that:
– Have quality-of-service constraints, and
– Are bandwidth-sensitive.
One well-studied example of an application that matches these properties is
Voice Over IP (VoIP), as described further in Section 3, where voice packets
must be routed to their destination within certain constraints on jitter and la-
tency, or else the received speech sounds unnatural (or possibly unintelligible).
The constrained nature of the communication channels through which VoIP
data typically travels necessitates the use of content-based variable-rate coding
schemes, so that the very timing of packet transmissions correlates with the
speech being transmitted [1, 36].
In our case, both of our victim applications, Google Maps and a web browser,
also satisfy these two properties. For Google Maps, the second condition (bandwidth-
sensitivity) derives from the sheer size of the world map on which Google Maps
is based; it is not feasible to store copies of this map on all devices. Indeed,
Google provides overlays that provide dynamic content (from ads or local points
of interest) that needs to be provided on-the-fly to the phone. Therefore, Google
provides map contents (“tiles”) piecemeal to a user, depending on the user’s
movements. The first condition for network side-channel sensitivity (quality-of-
service constraints) is evident from the real-time usage of such mapping services.
When a user is navigating with Google Maps, map information must be received
in a timely fashion as the user moves.
For web browsing, the different sizes and locations of page elements on a
website translate into variance in the bandwidth required to download a specific
web page. Since users are typically averse to delays in browsing times [25], it
is necessary to load webpages reasonably quickly, thereby satisfying the first
constraint.
2.1 Threat
Surprisingly enough, for many Android devices on the market, the Google
TrafficStats API provides fine-grained network side-channel information on
any running process without requiring any permissions; for these devices it is
possible to learn a variety of facets of a user’s location and web browsing habits
from any running app. Indeed, the typical user of a smartphone cannot be ex-
pected to understand the inner workings of smartphone applications. It is thus
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extremely easy to disguise an application as a game or some other simple util-
itarian task, while in the background inferring and even broadcasting sensitive
information, such as the user’s location or browsing history. With such unper-
missioned malware running, anyone receiving the broadcasts could obtain the
web browsing history of the smartphone user or elements of the user’s location
(as long as the user is using Google Maps). In essence, the capability to in-
fer a user’s location and obtain a user’s web browsing history by analyzing the
network traffic of applications undermines the permission request protocol and
potentially compromises user privacy [22, 30].
2.2 Android versions
Recently, Google has taken steps toward further protecting its users’ sensitive
information from such side-channels. As of Android Nougat (version 7.0, API
24), Google is phasing out some of the functionality of the TrafficStats class,
and replacing it with NetworkStatsManager, which requires a permission in
order to obtain network traffic about other applications [12]. Unfortunately, this
only helps mitigate, but does not necessarily eliminate, the threat:
– The TrafficStats class can still be used to acquire device-level network data
(i.e., the total network data of all running applications on the device). This
aggregate network data is sufficient for our attacks, with only a modest
reduction in effectiveness.
– The majority of users have not and will not upgrade their phones to Nougat
(or later versions) for some time (if ever) [11].
– It is not intuitive to either a typical user or a developer that allowing an
application to access network traffic data could possibly leak one’s location.
Many users may blithely grant network stats permissions to a malicious
application disguised as, say, a network usage monitoring tool.
3 Related work
Side-channel attacks aim to reveal sensitive information from the implementa-
tional byproducts of otherwise secure functionality. One of the classic examples
is Kocher’s attack on various cryptosystems [19], wherein a fine-grained statisti-
cal analysis of the amount of time required to perform cryptographic operations
revealed the secret key used in the operations. This attack was extended by
Genkin, Shamir and Tromer [8] to crack the secret key of a 4096-bit RSA cryp-
tosystem using acoustic emanations typically from voltage regulation circuits on
a laptop. Other side-channel attacks make use of analysis of power usage, faults,
or caches [2, 18, 27].
The network side-channel has also been a great source for information leak-
age. Encrypted VoIP services like Skype leak information about the language
spoken and speaker through the timing (and, in some cases, sizes) of their IP
packets [1, 36]. More advanced models in [34, 35] have been able to recreate the
actual audio transcript of what is being said over an encrypted VoIP connection
by measuring the same networking statistics.
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3.1 Location privacy
The closest work in the current literature may be that of Narain et al [26], who
use a phone’s gyroscope, accelerometer, and magnetometer to infer routes and
locations with reasonable accuracy; from such data, their results can provide,
for example, a list of 10 routes that include an actually traveled route with
greater than 50% probability. In a similar vein, the taxonomy in [33] highlights
a number of other sensor-based side-channel attacks on location, including using
accelerometer readings to infer mode of transportation [15], utilizing barometer
and elevation to infer driving routes [17], using speaker status information [37]
and observed power consumption [21]. Our work differs from these in looking
exclusively at network traffic, without requiring any sensor data, and yielding
reasonable results with very simple machine learning and classification algo-
rithms.
3.2 Web browsing privacy
Traffic analysis attacks on web browsing are not new, dating back at least to
Heyning Cheng and Ron Avnur’s paper in 1998 [3]. That work uses the size
of packets, their arrival times, and plaintext metadata to determine the spe-
cific page being viewed by a user on an identified host. Later work focuses on
more specific cases where the host information is not available, and all that
is given is the packet size and timing. Those works distinguish themselves in
their analyses. As the traffic analysis became more sophisticated, the task of
parsing the raw data was given to different machine learning algorithms, with
Herrmann [16] proposing the use of a Multinomial Naive-Bayes model with fre-
quency transformations and Panchenko [28] utilizing a Support Vector Machine.
Combining several such work together, Dyer used these methods to dismantle
common countermeasures proposed against this side-channel attack [6]. Other
work (e.g., [9, 10]) focuses on remote traffic analysis attacks that leverage band-
width leakage at routers to identify browsing habits of remote hosts and even to
launch deanonymization attacks on Tor users and relays [23]. Finally, the work
most similar to ours is that of Spreitzer et al. [32], wherein the authors show
extended results of experiments similar to ours for identifying visited websites
based on the network side-channel on Android. Their results use a different set
of techniques and appear to require the use of the TrafficStats class to access
the data sent by individual processes, whereas our attacks use only device-level
network statistics; with the newest version of Android, only device-level data is
freely available. As such, our work shows the attacks presented in previous pub-
lications are still effective using device-level, coarser grained network traffic, and
that our attacks are robust to certain (but not all) standard countermeasures.
4 Attacking Location Privacy
In this section, we present our attacks on location privacy using the network
side channel. Location is a particularly sensitive piece of information since, for
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example, with regular knowledge of a user’s location it is possible to infer other
sensitive and private information (e.g. medical conditions, political or religious
connections) [22], a suitable time to rob the user’s home, or a means for stalking
the user [30]. It is thus with good reason that Android applications wishing to
have access to a user’s location must typically explicitly request permissions for
this information.
We do not claim to provide complete fine-grained location tracking from
network patterns alone - this task would be quite ambitious, given that even
the Global Positioning System (Standard Positioning Service) guarantees only a
global average of 7.8m of accuracy (95% of the time) with the use of a constel-
lation of 24 satellites and a dedicated receiver [5].
Instead, we show that we are able to discern, with varying accuracy, a number
of potentially sensitive location features using only a black-box analysis of Google
Maps network usage patterns via the TrafficStats API. These features include:
– motion - detecting when a phone is in motion,
– speed - determining how fast the phone is moving,
– coarse location - inferring some coarse sense of where the phone might be
(e.g. in a city, in a remote location, ...), and
– path traversal - detecting when the phone traverses a specified path.
Putting these together, despite their individual issues of accuracy, will allow
us to construct a reasonably good understanding of the phone’s location at a
given time.
4.1 Key Tools
Before we describe the testing methodology, we would like to elaborate on the
key tools that we used for the experiments.
Google Maps Google Maps is a real time navigation app provided by Google on
Android. The app consists of a screen that depicts a map of the user’s location,
and as the user moves around, the map is updated with the user’s new location.
The map itself is composed of a series of tiles, as depicted in Figure 1. Due to
the Quality-of-Service constraints of the app (discussed in Section 2), updates
to the user’s map need to happen in real time by downloading new tiles as the
user moves around. This process of updating the map view in real time leaks
information about the user’s location, as one could potentially correlate the rate
at which these tiles are downloaded with the user’s location information.
TrafficStats TrafficStats is the Application Programming Interface (API) that
allows programs to tap into the network side channel that is inherent to Google
Maps. It is provided by the Android Framework and allows any app to monitor
certain network statistics, including:
– App level statistics: Provide the number of bytes sent/received by a given
app since device boot.
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Fig. 1. Tiles on Google Maps
– Device level statistics: Provide the number of bytes sent/received by the
entire device since device boot.
For the most recent versions of Android, only device level statistics are sup-
ported, and thus the majority of our tests are focused on extracting location
sensitive information from device level traffic (rather than the finer-grained app
level traffic). Indeed, we demonstrate meaningful inferences about a user’s loca-
tion from these device level statistics as long as there is not too much network
noise from other applications. We believe that this low noise assumption is rea-
sonable because many people use Google Maps in isolation while navigating.
GeoFix We conducted two sets of experiments: one within the Android emula-
tor, and another on an actual device carried around by one of the authors. Within
the emulator, location information was spoofed through GeoFix, a framework
provided by the Android emulator console. To utilize this framework, we initi-
ated a socket connection to the emulator (port 5554), and provided a geo fix
command:
geo fix <longitude value> <latitude value>
This allowed us to set the “location” of the emulator and move it around the
world as needed. In our experiments, we run this command in a loop, each time
incrementing the coordinates slightly to simulate motion in a chosen direction.
4.2 Experimental Setup
In order to use the TrafficStats API, we created a simple service that runs in the
background on an Android device or emulator, logs all app/device level traffic at
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a 0.5 millisecond granularity, and sends it to a remote server. We do this while
simultaneously running Google Maps in the foreground and simulating motion
(thereby forcing Google Maps to change the view on the app). Although Google
Maps was the only active foreground application, there was network noise from
other standard background applications (and GeoFix).
We used this setup to conduct four experiments:
– Detecting when a phone is in motion;
– Determining how fast the phone is moving;
– Inferring whether the phone is in a rural vs. urban area; and,
– Detecting when the phone traverses a specific path.
These experiments were conducted at large scale on network data collected
from an Android emulator, and then, in some cases, verified on a smaller scale
through network data collected from a real device. For emulator experiments, we
simulated motion with a simple python script that utilized GeoFix to incremen-
tally change the emulator’s GPS coordinates. For device experiments, motion
was produced by physically driving in the streets of Boston. Further details of
each experiment will be described in the sections that follow.
4.3 Data Sets
We next describe the dataset consisting of device level traffic collected from
an unpermissioned background service on a Nexus 6 API 23 emulator running
Google Maps and “traversing” various paths through GeoFix-based location em-
ulation. Our dataset consists of 432 paths, with paths differing along three ele-
ments:
– Location: the physical location of the path;
– Direction: the direction in which the path extends (e.g., North, South, East,
West or some combination thereof);
– Step interval: the time delay between subsequent steps on the path (cor-
responding to the speed of traversal).
Location. Our paths are distributed among twelve locations equally divided
between urban and rural environments, as described in Table 1.
Direction. For each of the twelve locations above, we considered three specific
directions, as shown in Figure 2.
Step interval. For each combination of location and direction, we also considered
twelve different delay periods between path steps. More precisely, each path
consisted of ten steps, taken at regular time intervals, which varied among twelve
different values. Due to geometric considerations (such as the curvature of the
Earth), paths at different locations or directions corresponded to different land
speeds, even if their inter-step time intervals were the same.
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Longitude Latitude Rural/Urban Locale
13.75 51.05 Urban Dresden, Germany
-71.11 42.35 Urban Boston, USA
77.10 28.70 Urban New Delhi, India
37.62 55.76 Urban Moscow, Russia
-105.14 39.76 Urban Denver, USA
77.35 12.95 Urban Bangalore, India
13.18 13.23 Rural Rural Chad
9.53 18.86 Rural Rural Niger
77.77 23.82 Rural Rural India
-105.78 43.25 Rural Rural Wyoming
-109.72 48.39 Rural Rural Montana
104.15 66.53 Rural Rural Russia
Table 1. Locations of paths in our dataset.
Start location
Direction 1
Direction 2
Direction 3
45o
Fig. 2. Paths of different directions taken for each location
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Summary In total, the number of paths we evaluated was
# places ∗# directions ∗# step intervals = 12 ∗ 3 ∗ 12 = 432.
Within the emulator, each path was attempted eight times to produce eight
datasets in total.
4.4 Experiments and Results
Motion Our first experiment concerned the ability to detect motion from the
network traffic side-channel alone. To test this, we held the emulator still for
fifteen seconds before each path traversal. In each case, our unpermissioned
background service collected network traffic on the emulator while Google Maps
was running in the foreground.
Our results show that motion is readily detectable both from application-level
network traffic data (Figure 3) and device-level network traffic data (Figure 4).
In the former case, Google Maps downloads no data until movement starts, and
that data thus show a crisp delineation of motion. In the latter case, there is
some background network noise, but the onset of motion is still quite clear at
the fifteen second mark.
Fig. 3. Application-level network traffic statistics of an emulator in eventual motion.
Speed Our second set of motion experiments attempted to determine whether
the speed of motion can be inferred from network byte inter-arrival times while
Google Maps was in the foreground. Intuitively, the faster the phone moves, the
12 M. Andreev et al.
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Fig. 4. Device-level network traffic statistics of an emulator in eventual motion.
more frequently Google Maps will have to download new tile data. As a result,
we expect an inverse relationship between the speed of the device and the time
interval between packet arrivals.
Since each of our paths corresponded to a different speed (as discussed in
Section 4.3), we had a fairly diverse collection of data points for comparing byte
inter-arrival rates (in seconds / byte) versus emulated speed (miles / hour). For
device-level data, the result is shown in Figure 5, confirms an inverse relationship,
although with significant noise due to other network traffic; indeed, each point
on the graph represents an average over eight trials, with error bars representing
one standard deviation after removing 10% of the data point outliers. For this
data, the best fit line is given by:
y =
0.0071617
x
,
Where the variance on the coefficient is 2.15037546 ∗ 10−8, suggesting a very
good fit.
For application level network traffic, we picked a single starting point and
covered paths in the three different directions (as described in Section 4.3), al-
though in our data the different directions did not seem to have much impact.
Each of these paths was traversed at a uniform speed, chosen among 10 differ-
ent speeds in increments of five miles / hour. The results, evident in Figure 6,
are significantly less noisy than their device-level counterparts but continue to
demonstrate the expected inverse relationship. Moreover, since the application
data comes solely from Google Maps, we can correlate spurts of traffic with tile
downloads, leading to the inference of a tile size of roughly 1000 bytes. This
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Fig. 5. Device-level byte arrival interval vs speed, showing an inverse relationship.
correlation also allowed us to depict Figure 6 in units of seconds/tile rather than
seconds/byte.
Finally, we see that the relationship obtained in Figure 6 is as follows:
y =
450
x
In order to validate this relationship, we conducted real world driving exper-
iments in which we drove an (unemulated) Nexus 4 phone around the city of
Boston, with the default Google Maps zoom level and navigation mode not en-
gaged. By correlating tile download interval and speed, we determined that each
downloaded tile (at the default zoom) represents roughly a 1/8 of a mile long
by 1/8 of mile wide patch of territory; thus, integrating tile arrivals over time
allowed us to predict the overall distance traveled by the phone. We then com-
pared our prediction to the actual distance travelled to produce Figure 7. In all,
we produced 84 recorded trips with physical distances ranging from 1 to 5 miles,
and almost all of our predicted distances were within ± 1/4 mile (2 tiles) of the
actual distance, as shown in Figure 7.
As such, through unpermissioned network traffic analysis, an application de-
veloper can infer a device’s speed and, by extension, the mode of transportation
being used at that time. Of course, changing the zoom level and navigation mode
settings could alter the tile download statistics, and it would be an interesting
extension to train our model at multiple setting parameters.
Coarse Location Our third set of experiments attempted to correlate the
network side-channel with properties of the location of the device. To test this,
we used the emulator to measure network usage as the phone moved around
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Fig. 6. Application-level tile arrival interval vs speed, showing an inverse relationship.
Fig. 7. Actual distance traveled vs. Absolute error (difference between predicted dis-
tance and actual distance) shows accuracy within 1/4 of a mile.
Nothing But Net 15
in different locations. We conjecture that Google Map tiles have different, and
potentially fingerprintable, amount of content. Intuitively, urban areas would
have more information per tile, so the tiles would be denser, while those of rural
areas would be sparser. Hence, we attempted to differentiate location types based
on the data download rates; cities would typically have higher data download
rates due to “denser” tiles, while rural areas would have smaller data download
rates due to “sparser” tiles.
We use a nearest neighbor classifier on the average download rate (in Bytes/Second)
to determine whether a phone is in a rural or urban location. We conducted this
experiment using device-level traffic consisting of 432 paths (positioned in 6
urban and 6 rural areas, as discussed in Section 4.3). Across these paths, we
can identify whether the device is in an urban or rural location with a Correct
Classification Rate (CCR) of 67%.
While this is not as precise as we had hoped, this clearly shows that there
is a non-zero correlation between the network side-channel and the physical
location of the device. We conjecture that with more extensive data collection
and more careful modeling and analysis, much better location identification can
be achieved.
Path Traversal Our final set of experiments aimed to identify a particular
path of travel from a predefined set of possible paths. Intuitively, specific paths
will have a rather unique sequence of speeds along the path that may be used
for classification. Since these unique features are hard to emulate, we have to
capture actual traffic patterns and road information, these experiments were
only performed using real-world measurements rather than emulated movement.
For this reason, we only present results for a limited set of paths. However, even
with this small data set, it is clear that driven paths can be predicted pretty
accurately using only the network side channel.
We collect data on a Nexus 4 smart phone while driving the specified paths in
the greater Boston area. We recorded data usage across six different paths, with
ten different recordings of each path. To test the correlation of path with data
usage, we divide this dataset into 2 sets of paths, one labeled, and the other
unlabeled. For the time series data of each path in the unlabeled dataset, we
compute its Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PCC) with all paths in the labeled
dataset to measure how well correlated the unlabeled path is with each labeled
path. We then classify the unlabeled path as whichever labeled path it gets the
maximum PCC with (time series originating from the same paths should be
similar, and hence should have a PCC close to 1).
We utilized the following paths, all located in the greater Boston area:
1. Mountfort to Cambridge
2. Cambridge to Mountfort
3. General Electric (Lynn) to Charlesgate (Kenmore)
4. YI (Synagogue - Brookline) to General Electric
5. Mountfort to Maimo (High school in Brookline)
6. Ivy Street to Butch (store in Brookline)
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The results of the classification model are presented in Table 2. Here each
column corresponds to a traveled path, while the rows indicate what path the
classification outputs. We note that some paths are identified quite well. For
example, paths 2 and 3 are identified correctly in over 95% of cases. Other paths
are less unique, thus leading to lower classification scores. For example, paths
1 and 6 share a significant stretch of road, and are thus often misclassified for
one another. However, these paths can still be distinguished from the remaining
paths with high probability. While the total Correct Classification Rate (CCR)
across all paths is only 77%, this shows that some paths are uniquely identifiable
while other, more similar paths, can be grouped still providing some information
about the actual location of the device.
Classified as Actual Path
Path 1 Path 2 Path 3 Path 4 Path 5 Path 6
Path 1 60% 2% 2% 1% 10% 20%
Path 2 0% 82% 0% 0% 16% 3%
Path 3 0% 0% 98% 0% 0% 10%
Path 4 0% 0% 0% 96% 10% 6%
Path 5 0% 11% 0% 3% 64% 0%
Path 6 40% 5% 0% 0% 0% 61%
Total Correct Classification Rate: 77%
Table 2. Path Classification Results. The columns correspond to the actual path
travelled, while the rows correspond to the identified path.
5 Attacking Web Browser Privacy
We next present our attacks on web browsing privacy using the network side
channel. The websites one visits may reveal private traits such as shopping in-
terests, religious affiliation, or membership in various clubs and groups, and
the ability to unmask this information and correlate it with timing, using an
app which requires no-permissions, may thus pose a significant privacy concern.
Unlike the previous section, the attacks described in this section only leverage
device-level network statistics as opposed to per-app network statistics; this in-
formation is available to all apps, without any required permissions, running on
even the latest Android phones.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. We begin with a descrip-
tion of the testing methodology in Section 5.1, describing the processing and
data collection for our experiments. Then, we describe common side-channel
countermeasures in Section 5.2. Finally, we collate all our results for website
classification and countermeasure robustness in Section 5.3.
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5.1 Testing Methodology
The methodology used for this attack can be divided into several sections: an
Android Layer to collect network usage data on the Android device, a Prepro-
cessing Layer to transform this raw data into feature vectors, and a Support
Vector Machine (SVM) Layer to perform the website classification.
Fig. 8. Android application class structure. All branches off of Traffic Sniffer run in
parallel.
Android Layer This layer consists of an Android app used to gather data,
in our case the timing, size, and numbers of packets being sent or received
by the device. The app itself consists of several components diagrammed in
Figure 8. A TrafficSniffer controls the application and provides a graphi-
cal interface. A FileLogger and DriveController work to upload captured
data up to a Google Drive server. A TrafficMonitor, NetworkMonitor, and
ProcessAppManager run in parallel to obtain side-channel information about
the device. The TrafficMonitor uses the TrafficStats API included in the
Android framework [13] to acquire packet, data, and timing information roughly
every millisecond.
As mentioned in Section 2, TrafficStats can keep track of an individual
app’s network statistics using its ID. In the newer Android versions this feature
has been restricted, leaving only device-level traffic statistics (with the resulting
additional noise).
Test data is acquired with an AutomatedSearching class that performs web-
site requests against specified URLs at thirty second intervals. The timing of the
requests is recorded and then correlated to network traffic.
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Our specific experimental setup involved the sampling of 128 URLs chosen
as the most popular sites on the Alexa top 500 most visited websites. In addition
to being very popular (and, thus, likely to be observed in a user session), these
URLs span a range of website categories (e.g., web search, news, social media,
and video), ensuring that a generally successful attack would be broad enough
to cover different usage models. In all, 19199 website requests were targeted
against these URLs, averaging roughly 150 requests per URL. All requests were
performed on a Samsung Galaxy S5 device, with all standard processes running
for background noise, with the sole exception of updates, which are infrequent
but have exceptionally bursty utilization of network traffic.
Preprocessing Layer Our preprocessing layer involves transforming raw data
inputs into relevant feature vectors. In order to support the variety of input data,
this required experimentation to determine the optimal parameters for tasks such
as frame size selection, packet filtering, and transformation of collected data into
feature vectors. In the end, we made the following design decisions.
Frame Size Selection Our first preprocessing selection was to choose the size of
an input frame from which to draw input data, or, in other words, the amount of
network traffic data to correlate with a particular request. For sake of simplicity,
we used a frame size of 30 seconds, corresponding to the interval time from the
AutomatedSearching class of the Android Layer; Figures 9 and 10 show some of
our captured traffic data over one such frame. Of course, real users are not likely
to methodically look at websites in 30 second intervals, and future extensions
would have to take this into account.
Fig. 9. Bytes per second entering (positive) or leaving (negative) the phone in a single
frame.
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Fig. 10. Packets per second entering (positive) or leaving (negative) the phone in a
single frame.
Packet Filtering Next, we had to apply filtering to clean up noise in the collected
data. As can be seen in Figures 9 and 10, the “bytes per time” and “packets
per time” measures are not always aligned in time, and we thus first matched a
packet to a set of bytes based on their proximity to each other. Thereafter, we
filtered packets smaller than 100 bytes, which was determined experimentally,
in order to reduce noise.
Transformation Schemes We also attempted to use several different transforma-
tion schemes to get feature vectors that produced good results from our classifier.
Throughout these transformation schemes, we use the convention that data go-
ing into the phone is treated as a positive value, and data going out is treated
as a negative value.
– “onion” - This transformation scheme uses the features presented by [28],
derived from raw data, which include: aggregate byte markers for data di-
rection changes rounded to 600, aggregate packet markers for data direction
changes, total transmitted and received bytes rounded to 10000, total trans-
mitted and received packets rounded to 15, different occurring packet sizes,
and percentage of incoming packets versus outgoing packets rounded to steps
of 5. The rounding boundaries were selected from the paper. The values are
then aggregated into a single feature vector, and, together, give us a statis-
tical view of the data while reducing noise through rounding.
– term frequency transformation with cosine normalization - Follow-
ing the work in [16], we generated a term frequency vector whose i-th com-
ponent corresponds to the frequency fxi of packets of size xi. The term
frequency transformation is then given by
f∗xi = log(1 + fxi),
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and its cosine normalization is determined by dividing by the Euclidean
length (|| · ||) of the transformed vectors:
fnormxi =
f∗xi
||(f∗x1 , ..., f∗xn)||
.
– number of packets - This transform simply takes the number of incoming
packets and the number of outgoing packets per frame, and combines them
into a two dimensional array, as in Figure 11.
In our testing with different parameters, we found “number of packets” to be
both the simplest and the most effective transformation.
Fig. 11. Representation of the data entries using the number of packets entering or
leaving the phone. Yellow dots indicate website requests against google.com, and black
dots indicate requests against facebook.com.
SVM Layer To assign a URL to an input feature vector, we turn to a machine
learning algorithm called a Support Vector Machine, or SVM, which are used
for binary classification problems [24]. The primary goal of an SVM is to create
a decision boundary between two sets of data, where, ideally, all data points on
one side of a boundary have the same label. SVMs further define a set of margins
around the decision boundary, so that no data points exist between a margin and
a decision boundary. By creating a margin around the decision boundary, the
SVM reduces any overfitting that could be present in a more basic perceptron.
Instead of choosing the simplest boundary that fits the data, SVMs create a
more distinct separation between classes, which may allow new, testing data to
be classified more accurately.
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If the data an SVM is trying to classify is not linearly separable, other func-
tions may be used to calculate the decision boundary and margins. In our case,
we used the radial basis function (RBF) to calculate the decision boundary. Since
our algorithm works on a linear learning scheme, it can be difficult to create a
proper non-linear decision boundary, and we thus make use of the ”kernel trick”
or ”kernel method” [24] to map the radial function inputs into a different di-
mensional space, where the calculations become straightforward to perform. The
mapping function is referred to as a kernel, and for RBF it is:
K(x, x′) = e−γ||x−x
′′||2 ,
where parameter γ is described below, x and x′ are feature vectors, and || · ||
represents the Euclidean distance between the vectors. For a given set of features,
these mappings can be put together into a kernel (or Gram) matrix K, whose
entries Kij = K(xi, xj).
There are two parameters we have to balance to obtain an optimal classifica-
tion: the γ parameter, which determines the smoothness of the decision bound-
ary, and cost parameter (C) that determines the cost of having an imperfect
boundary (i.e., how bad is it if a point is misclassified).
We trained the classifier by first calculating the kernel matrix as described
above, and feeding the kernel matrix and the feature vectors into a quadratic
programming optimization. From there, testing inputs can be passed into the
model, which will return a value that determines what side of the boundary that
input lies on, giving its label. Our code for this is all written in python and
makes extensive use of numpy, for numerical support, and cvxopt, for convex
optimization.
We use SVMs to perform three different classifications.
One vs. One Classification First, we evaluated how well our classifier can dis-
tinguish which of two URLs has been visited. The test for a one on one com-
parison is fairly straightforward. We use cross-validation to separate the input
data into five sections. Each section takes a turn being the testing section, while
the remaining four sections are used for training. We then average the correct
classification rate to get the final rate for the test. This is then repeated across
all URL pairs giving us a perspective on how URLs match up. The results in
this classification are used to determine how to create different matches of more
than two URLs.
One vs. All Classification Next, we designed a classifier to identify URLs that
are sufficiently unique in their bandwidth usage that they can be distinguished
from all the rest. The test for a “one vs. all” classification is similar to that of
“one vs one”, except that one of the labels being trained now has a set of 127
URLs, allowing us to treat the 127 URLs as a single category. By performing
this test we can determine which URLs are separable from the rest.
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Website Identification Finally, we investigated the feasibility of uniquely iden-
tifying the URL of a visited website among 128 possibilities. We consider two
different techniques for doing such identification
Cascade: Because the SVM we are using can only perform a binary classifica-
tion, we need to expand the number of test we do to determine the URL. We do
this by separating all 128 into two groups of 64 vs. 64. The sample is classified
in one group or the other. We then split that group into 32 vs. 32, and continue
classifying, eventually reaching the “one vs. one” level and determine the final
URL. To determine which URLs are in which group, we used both a random se-
lection method, and a greedy separation The random selection simply randomly
allocated equal numbers of URLs to each side. The greedy separation randomly
selected the first URL, then used the highest “one vs. one” comparison result
with that URL to select a second URL. It continued this selection for each entry
in the current pool.
One vs. One Tree: An alternative method to determining which URL a test
sample belongs to is performing a series of “one vs. one” matches and obtaining
a list of resulting URLs then repeating. This works seperating out the 128 URLs
into 64 groups of two. A SVM is trained for each of these groups, and then a test
sample is fed through the models. The models will select one of the two URLs
they are trainged for. These URLs that are selected are then taken up to the
next level, where they are seperated into 32 groups of two. This repeats until we
classify the final two URLs. The selection for which two URLs to compare was
performed both randomly and greedily.
5.2 Countermeasures
Next, we highlight several countermeasures that are often proposed against traf-
fic analysis problems. We will describe these countermeasures here, then show
how effective they are against our model.
– Random-session padding - adding random amounts of padding to dif-
ferent sessions, causing some requests to give a different byte profile than
others for the same URL.
– Random-packet padding - adding a random amount of byte padding to
each packet, causing sizes to fluctuate significantly.
– Pad to Ceilings - padding each packet until they all appear to be the same
size.
– Exponential Padding - random padding on a large scale, increasing the
sizes of packets by a factor of 2.
– Linear Padding - padding each packet by the same amount.
– Pad to max - padding the packets to the maximum allowed amounts.
– Random Packet pad to max - padding random packets to their maximum
amount, leaving others untouched.
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Fig. 12. Correct Classification Rate (CCR) when using different C and γ parameters.
In this scale, lighter indicates better CCR. Values of C and γ are 2 raised to the power
of any given tick mark.
– Random Packet insertions - adding random packets of random size to
the data stream.
– Uniform Adding - confusing the packet data stream in a more uniform
manner.
– Session Random Adding - adding random amounts of packets to random
sessions, leaving other sessions unchanged.
– Proxies - using a proxy to aggregate traffic, a common suggestion against
traffic analysis attacks; the methods presented will fairly easily overcome this
defense, although with the potential addition of noise, potentially harming
classification.
5.3 Browsing Results
We present the results of three different sets of experiments. The first set of
experiments is used to determine the optimal parameters and transformation
to use in the preprocessing phase. The next set of experiments evaluates the
performance of the different classification tasks after this preprocessing is per-
formed. Finally, the third set of experiments examines the effects of the proposed
countermeasures.
The Correct Classification Rate (CCR) is used here to show the ratio of
correctly classified samples to all samples:
CCR =
Ycorrect
Ytotal
.
In our graphs, we multiply this ratio by 100 to get a percentage value for
ease of reading.
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Fig. 13. Correct Classification Rate (CCR) when using different cutoff filter sizes and
transforms.
Choosing Parameters After running many tests against different parameters
we see the optimal classification parameters are filter size = 100 bytes, C
= 256, γ = .000000954, using the “number of packets” transformation. These
result indicate that coarser separation produces better classification. The high
filter size indicates that small packets are fairly common across different websites,
and thus not of particular use in differentiation. Having a very high C coefficient
and a very low γ parameter indicates a non-smooth boundary and small margins,
which may cause some overfitting. Figure 12 shows the relationship of C and γ
with the correct classification rate, while Figure 13 shows the effect of different
cutoff filters and transforms.
An interesting result is that despite the availability of more complex process-
ing strategies, it is the most simple method, looking at the number of packets,
that proved most effective. This is likely due to the low resolution of our data;
previous work [28], [16] was able to use very fine-grained packet sizing and timing,
making complex methods much more effective. However, when there is uncer-
tainty in the timing and size, the simpler methods tend to avoid the over-fitting
that plague more complex methods.
Classification Performance
One vs. One Classification The ”one vs. one” classification test was run against
all pairs of URLs to give us a view of how different URLs compared with each
other. This gives us a basis to form classification groups in later tests. It also gives
us a view of which URLs are very distinct from each other, and which are similar.
Overall, our average classification rate was 87.88%. Our best classification was
97.42% between google.com and t.co. Table 3 shows a sample of the test results,
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Dailymail Samsung Yahoo Amazon Google Twitch Tumblr
Alibaba 91.29% 73.75% 94.48% 77.21% 90.60% 69.95% 84.07%
Dailymail 90.68% 84.11% 88.93% 94.82% 93.39% 85.73%
Samsung 91.97% 84.39% 93.89% 86.60% 60.04%
Yahoo 94.48% 94.37% 96.07% 93.04%
Amazon 95.12% 90.08% 87.35%
Google 87.21% 95.04%
Twitch 91.15%
Table 3. 8x8 Sample of 1 vs 1 test results. The values in the table show the CCR when
comparing the two sites given by the row and column labels.
Fig. 14. Distribution of correct classification rates for 1 vs 1 test.
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and Figure 14 shows the overall distribution. It is clear that it is easy to tell
apart most URLs on a one on one basis.
However, some of the matches produce very low results, from which we can
deduce those websites appear to be similar. Some of these websites makes sense:
different versions of Google home page, google.com vs live.com. Others are more
surprising: google.com vs instagram.com. Although the results found here may
be circumstantial, further study might unearth a relationship between a low
classification rate and a website type.
Fig. 15. Shows distribution of classification rates for 1 vs all test.
One vs. All Classification The “one vs. all” classification test was run against all
URLs to see which could be determined easily. Figure 15 shows the distribution
of this classification. Most results are understandably low. However, for a set of
35 URLs (e.g., facebook, baidu, dropbox), our CCR is around 0.75. The reason
behind this result is that when we train our SVM to classify 127 different URLs
as one class, we are essetially creating an ”average” website to classify. Websites
that do not fit this ”average” become easy to spot, allowing fast identification.
Although this comparison will not yield good results for all URLs, an attacker
can use it to quickly identify usage of specific websites. In addition, along with
the findings of the “one vs. one” test, this could be taken further to establish a
relationship between website types.
Website Classification
Cascade This test was done in two parts. The difference between the parts] was
how the selection of URLs for each cascade was done. In the first part, random
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Fig. 16. Average CCR for each stages of the cascade. This shows how each individual
stage performed, regardless of how the previous stage classified its data. The x-axis
indicates the number of URLs in the stage.
Fig. 17. Average successive CCR for each stage of the cascade. This shows how each
stage performed, given the previous stage’s results. The x-axis indicates the number of
URLs in the stage. The final x-tick indicates the final classification of 1 URL against
the rest.
28 M. Andreev et al.
Fig. 18. Average CCR for each stage of the cascade using greedy selection. This shows
how each individual stage performed, regardless of how the previous stage classified its
data.
Fig. 19. Average successive CCR for each stage of the cascade using greedy selection.
This shows how each stage performed, given the previous stage’s results.
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Fig. 20. Average successive CCR at each stage of the tree. Initially starting with all
URLs paired against each other, we successively eliminated less likely URLs to get a
final result.
selection was done. In the second part, URLs were chosen by a greedy approach
by using the highest “one vs. one” classifications.
Figure 16 shows the correct classification rate at each stage of the first part.
Each stage represents the next level of the cascade. For example, the first stage
compares 64 URLs against the other 64 URLs. The second stage compare 32
URLs against the other 32 URLs as passed down from one of the 64 URL groups
from the stage above. In this graph we are showing how the stage performed
individually, that is, if given a set of test samples, how well can this stage separate
the samples into the correct groups.
As can be seen, the fewer URLs at a given stage, the better the classifica-
tion rate. This indicates it is easier to differentiate URLs individually than in
aggregate.
Meanwhile, Figure 17 shows the result as the stages work sequentially. This
means we first run our test samples through the first stage. Those that were
classified correctly are then run through the second stage. We repeat this process
until we classify each test sample into a given URL. As can be seen, the further
stage we get to, the lower our CCR becomes as classification errors in previous
stages become compounded in the later ones.
Our final CCR is 6.32%, which is clearly better than the random guessing
situation (with a CCR of 0.78%). However, we are not able to get as high results
as some previous studies [6], [28], and [32]. This in part is due to the classifi-
cation method and filters, but is probably in larger part related to the limited
information available in this attack method.
Figure 18 shows our attempt to improve classification using a greedy selection
method. This gives us modest gains at each of the stages. Figure 19 shows the
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result of the cascade, which has a final CCR of 9.34%. We can learn from this
that the method of separating which URLs are compared can greatly increase
our accuracy.
One vs. One Tree Finally, we changed the approach in the cascade method to
see if using a single classification improved our results. Figure 20 shows the pro-
gression through each stage of the tree. For this method we also tested different
selection approaches by determining if the URLs compared in each trial were
random, fixed, or greedily chosen. Our best result was with the first URL being
randomly selected, and the second being greedily extracted. We obtained a CCR
of 16.14%.
Overall, we can see that when we have a large number of URLs to select
from, the noise and limited information in our data starts to take effect by
greatly reducing the final classification rate. However, even with this limitation,
an attacker can reliably deduce a small subset of URLs a user can be visiting.
Further, with greater variability in matchup selection, even higher rates could
be achieved.
Countermeasure Effectiveness Finally, we performed tests to determine the
effectiveness of standard side-channel countermeasures. The results for this can
be seen in Table 4. These tests were done using the same parameters as the binary
classification of google.com vs. facebook.com. By looking at the countermeasures,
Countermeasure Correct Classification Rate
Random-session padding 88.13%
Random-packet padding 92.56%
Linear padding 87.16%
Exponential Padding 91.66%
Pad to ceilings 87.16%
Pad to max 93.13%
Random-packet pad to max 85.27%
Random Packet Insertions 50.00%
Uniform adding 56.12%
Session-random 50.00%
Table 4. Correct classification rate after different countermeasures when applied to
Google vs Facebook binary classification.
we see that “byte padding” is not very effective regardless of what scheme is
used. Although there is a slight decrease in accuracy, likely due to interference
from using the filter cutoff, the decrease in classification is not significant. On
the other hand, introducing random packets into the data-flow causes a severe
decrease in correct classification. This is likely due to the transformation at work.
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Since we are looking at the number of packets being used, changing that by a
random value causes significant noise in the input samples.
The other countermeasure commonly suggested against traffic analysis at-
tacks is the use of proxies, a sample of whose effect we already see by aggregating
all network traffic on the device. The increased noise of a large proxy might be
mitigated by more precise measurement techniques.
6 Conclusions
We have demonstrated the potential for significant user privacy violations on
an Android phone from the network side-channel. Our specific attack scenarios
focused on identifying a user’s location and browsing patterns, which may be cor-
related with deeply personal user information. More concretely, our results show
that a variety of sensitive information about a user’s location and web browsing
habits are leaked from the networking metadata available to any application on
Android phones.
Rather than being an esoteric technical vulnerability, we demonstrate the
effectiveness of these attacks in a variety of experimental setups. The type of
information leaked through these channels might be used to infer very personal
information about the user, such as religious/political affinities and medical con-
ditions.
Ultimately, our results illustrate the need to better understand and regulate
the metadata that is made available during routine operations of a mobile device.
It is unreasonable to expect users, and even most app developers, to be aware
of the all such side channels and their implications on the privacy of their data.
Thus, we cannot expect them to properly navigate this challenging space when
choosing what data to share or to collect with their apps. Instead, we hope that
by demonstrating such attacks we will help guide design and regulatory decisions
made by industry and regulatory bodies to put in place protections that will steer
app developers and users clear from such vulnerabilities. We note that Google’s
recent decision to downgrade some of the functionality of the TrafficStats
class is a step in this direction as it significantly reduces the amount of freely
available network side-channel information, and we hope that our work will lead
to further strengthening of user privacy.
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